We present the software architecture and implementation of an eficient data structure for dynamically maintaining an authenticated dictionary. The building blocks of the data structure are skip lists and one-way commutative hash functions. We also present the results of a preliminary experiment on the performance of the data structure. Applications of our work include certijicate revocation in public key infrastructure and the pubkcation of data collections on the Internet.
-Introduction
We present the software architecture and implementation of an efficient and practical data structure for dynamically maintaining a distributed collection of elements in an authenticated manner. Applications of our work include certificate revocation in public key infrastructure and authenticated publication of data collections on the Internet.
The problem we address involves three parties: a trusted source, an untrusted directory, and a user. The source defines a finite set S of elements that evolves over time through insertions and deletions of elements. The directory maintains a copy of set S. It receives time-stamped updates from the source together with update authentication information, such as signed statements about the update and the current elements of the set. The user performs-membership queries on the set S of the type "is element e in set S?' but instead of contacting the source directly, it queries the directory. The directory provides the user with a yeslno answer to the query together with answer authentication information, which yields a proof of the answer assembled by combining statements signed by the source. The user then
Metrics and Applications
We can formalize the above goals as the algorithmic problem of minimizing the following cost parameters of an authenticated dictionary for the set S:
1.
2.
3.
4.

.
6.
space used by the data structures maintained by the source, directory, and user; time spent by the directory to perform an update initiated by the source; size of the update authentication information sent by the source in an update (source-to-directory); time spent by the directory to answer a query and return the answer authentication information as a proof of the answer; size of the answer authentication information sent by the directory together with the answer (directory-touser); time spent by the user to verify the answer to a query.
Authenticated dictionaries have a number of applications, including scientific data mining (e.g., genomic querying [20] and astrophysical querying [24, 10, 25]), geographic data servers (e.g., GIS querying), third-party publication on the Internet [12] , and certificate revocation in public key infrastructure [21, 28, 29 , 1, 11, 19, 151.
In the third-party publication application [ 121, the source is a trusted organization (e.g., a stock exchange) that produces and maintains integrity-critical content (e.g., stock prices) and allows third party publishers (e.g., Web portals), to publish this content on the Internet so that it is widely disseminated. The publishers store copies of the content produced by the source. They perform content updates originating from the source and process queries on such content made by the users. However, the publishers are not assumed to be trustworthy, for a given publisher may be processing updates from the source incorrectly or it may be the victim of a system break-in. Thus, in addition to returning the result of a query, a publisher should also return a proof of authenticity of the result.
In the certificate revocation application [2 1,28,29, 1, 1 1, 19, 151, the source is a cert$cation authority (CA) that digitally signs certificates binding entities (e.g., identities or attributes) to their public keys, thus guaranteeing this binding. Nevertheless, certificates are sometimes revoked (e.g., if a private key is lost or compromised, or if someone loses their authority to use a particular private key). Thus, the user of a certificate must be able to verify that a given certificate has not been revoked. To facilitate such queries, the set of revoked certificates is distributed to certijcate revocation directories, which process revocation status queries on behalf of users. The results of such queries need to be trustworthy, for they often form the basis for electronic commerce transactions.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews previous work on authenticated dictionaries, especially in the context of certificate revocation. Our software architecture for authenticated dictionaries is described in Section 3. Our prototype implementation of an authenticated dictionaries based on skip lists and commutative hashing is outlined in Section 4. In Section 5, we report the results of a preliminary experiment on the performance of our data structure, and we conclude in Section 6.
Previous and Related Work
In this section, and throughout the rest of this paper, we denote with n the current number of elements of the set S stored in the authenticated dictionary.
Authenticated dictionaries are related to research in distributed computing (e.g., data replication in a network [5, 23] ), data structure design (e.g., program checking [6, 8, 9, 321 and memory checking [7, 13] ), and cryptography (e.g., incremental cryptography [2, 3, 13, 141).
Certificate Revocation
Previous work on authenticated dictionaries has been conducted primarily in the context of certificate revocation in public-key infrastructure (PKI). The traditional method for certificate revocation (e.g., see [21] ) is for the CA (source) to sign a statement consisting of a timestamp plus a hash of the set of all revoked certificates, called certijcute revocation list (CRL), and periodically send the signed CRL to the directories. A directory then just forwards that entire signed CRL to any user who requests the revocation status of a certificate. This approach is secure, but it is inefficient, for it requires the transmission of the entire set of revoked certificates for both source-to-directory and directory-to-user communication. This scheme corresponds to an authenticated dictionary where both the update authentication information and the answer authentication information has size O(n). Because of the inefficiency of the underlying dictionary, CRLs are not a scalable solution for certificate revocation.
Micali [28] proposes an alternate approach, where the source periodically sends to each directory the list of all issued certificates, each tagged with the signed time-stamped value of a one-way hash function (e.g., see [31] ) that indicates if this certificate has been revoked or not. This approach allows the system to reduce the size of the answer authentication information to 0(1) words: namely just a certificate identifier and a hash value indicating its status. Unfortunately, this scheme requires the size of the update authentication information to increase to O ( N ) , where N is the number of all non-expired certificates issued by the certifying authority, which is typically much larger than the number, n, of revoked certificates.
Hash Trees
The hash tree scheme introduced by Merkle [26, 271 can be used to implement a static authenticated dictionary, which supports the initial construction of the data structure followed by query operations, but not update operations (without complete rebuilding). A hash tree T for a set S stores the elements of S at the leaves of T and a label f ( v ) at each node U . defined as follows:
where U and w are the left and right child of U, respectively, and h is a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function, such as MD5 or SHAl .
The authenticated dictionary for S consists of the hash tree T plus the signature of a statement consisting of a timestamp and the label f (~) stored at the root T of T . An element z is proven to belong to S by reporting the labels of the nodes on the path in T from the leaf storing z to the root, together with the values of all nodes that have siblings on this path. Each node in this path must be identified as a left or right child, and the path must be given in order, so that the user can recompute the root's hash value and compare it to the current signed value. It is important that all this order and connectivity information be presented to the user, for without it the user would have great difficulty recomputing the hash value for the root. This hash tree scheme can be extended to validate that an item z is not in S by keeping the leaves of T sorted and then returning the leaf-to-root paths, and associated hash values, for two elements y and z such that y and z are stored at consecutive leaves of T and y < < z , or (in the boundary cases) y is undefined and z is the left-most leaf or z is undefined and y is the right-most leaf. Again, the user is required to know enough about binary trees to be able to verify from the topology of the two paths that y and z are stored at consecutive leaves.
Kocher [22] also advocates a static hash tree approach for realizing an authenticated dictionary, but simplifies somewhat the processing done by the user to validate that an item is not in the set S. In his solution, the leaves of the hash tree store the intervals defined by the consecutive elements in the sorted sequence of the elements of S. A membership query for an item z always returns a leaf v and the interval [y, z ] stored at w such that y 5 z < 2 , together with the path from w to the root and all sibling hash values for nodes along this path. The user validates this path by recomputing the hash values of the nodes in this path, keeping track of whether nodes are left children or right children of their respective parents. Although there is a minor extra overhead of now having to have a way of representing -cm and +CO, this method simplifies the verification for the case when an item is not in S (which will usually be the case in certificate revocation applications). It does not support updates of the set S , however.
Dynamic Hash Trees
Using techniques from incremental cryptography, Naor and Nissim [29] dynamize hash trees to support the insertion and deletion of elements. In their scheme, the source and the directory maintain identically-implemented 2-3 trees. Each leaf of such a 2-3 tree T stores an element of set S, and each internal node stores a one-way hash of its children's values. Hence, the source-to-directory communication is reduced to 0(1) items, since the source sends insert and remove instructions to the directory, together with a signed statement consisting of a timestamp and the hash value of the root of T .
A directory responds to a membership query for an element z as follows: if z is in S , then the directory supplies the path of T from the leaf storing z to the root, together with all siblings of nodes on this path; else (2 is not in S ) , the directory supplies the leaf-to-root paths from two consecutive leaves storing y and z such that y < z < z , together with all siblings of the nodes on these paths. By tracing these paths, the user can recompute the hash values of their nodes, ultimately recomputing the hash value for the root, which is then compared against the signed hash value of the root for authentication. One can apply Kocher's interval idea to this scheme asan alternative way of validating items that are not in the dictionary S. There are nevertheless some drawbacks of this approach. Dynamic 2-3 trees are not trivial to program correctly. In addition, since nodes in a 2-3 tree can have two or three children, one must take special care in the structuring of the answer authentication information sent by the directory to the user. Namely, all sibling nodes returned must be classified as being left children, middle children (if they exist), or right children. Recomputing the hash value at the root requires that a user be able to match the computation done at the source as regards a particular leaf-to-root path.
Other certificate revocation schemes based on variations of hash trees have been recently proposed in [ 11, 151, as well, but do not deviate significantly from the above approaches. Table 1 . Comparison of data structures for authenticated dictionaries. We use n to denote the size of the dictionary, t to denote the number of updates since a queried element has been created, and N to denote the size of the universe the elements of the dictionary come from. We denote with p an integer such that 1 5 p 5 n. The time and information size bounds of the Goodrich-Tamassia scheme are expected with high probability, while they are worst-case for the other schemes.
Skip Lists
Goodrich and Tamassia [ 181 have devised a data structure for an authenticated dictionary based on skip lists [30] . They introduce the notion of commutative hashing and show how to embed in the nodes of a skip list a computational DAG (directed acyclic graph) of cryptographic computations based on commutative hashing. This data structure matches the asymptotic performance of the NaorNissim approach [29] , while simplifying the details of an actual implementation of a dynamic authenticated dictionary. In particular, the choice of a skip list and commutative hashing to implement an authenticated dictionary has the following benefits over approaches based on hash trees: 0 It replaces the complex details of 2-3 trees with the easy-to-implement details of skip lists.
0 It avoids the complication of storing intervals at leaf nodes [22] , and instead returns to the intuitive concept of storing actual items at the leaf nodes.
0 It greatly simplifies the verification process for a user, while retaining the basic security properties of signing a collection of values via cryptographic hashing. We compare the asymptotic performance of data structures for authenticated dictionaries in Table 1 .
One-way Accumulators
Software Architecture
We have designed a general object-oriented software architecture for authenticated dictionaries and we have implemented it in Java. A high-level view of the software architecture is shown in Figure 2 . In our architecture, an entity, called certijication authoriq, or CA, has been added to the participants of the authenticated dictionary protocol. The CA is the only trusted entity in the system. It initiates updates and provides a signed statement to authenticate each update. This statement is modeled by an object called the Basis. In our formalization, the source acts as the intermediary between the CA and the directory. It forwards to the directory each update and its associated basis. The directory replies to queries made by the user by returning an object called AuthenticResponse, whose data fields provide the answer authentication information.
We use six interfaces (APIs) to describe our authenticated dictionary system: AuthenticatedDictionary, with its subinterfaces MirrorAuthenticatedDictionary and SourceAuthenticatedDictionary, AuthenticResponse, Update, and Basis.
Queries
Interfaces AuthenticatedDictionary, AuthenticResponse, and Basis relate to querying. At the heart of the query system is the AuthenticatedDictionary. An instance of AuthenticResponse has a method, subject, to identify the element of the query for which the response is issued, and a method, subjectcontained, to determine whether or not the element is contained by the dictionary. There is also a method for determining whether or not the response is valid, called validatesAgainst, which takes an instance of Basis as its parameter.
The user should trust that the answer about the membership of the object returned by subject in the dictionary provided that subjectcontained is correct and the following are verified:
1. the user trusts that the datu stored in the instance of Basis has not been tampered with, e.g., because it has been signed by the CA.;
2. the user trusts that the code executed by the methods of the AuthenticResponse has not been tampered with, e.g., because it has been signed by the CA;
3. method validatesAgainst returns true.
A schematic interaction diagram for a query is shown in Figure 3 . Note that method verifyBasis0 is not part of the interfaces discussed above.
The data represented by the Basis and AuthenticResponse objects are implementationidependent. For example, in the hash tree data structure, the basis is the label of the root of the tree, and the AuthenticResponse object for an element in the set contains the sequence of labels (and associated left-childright-child) indicators, for the siblings of the nodes in the path from the leaf containing the element to the root. Method validatesAgainst recomputes the label of the root by hashing the labels in the sequence in the appropriate order and compares the value so obtained with the one provided by the basis.
Updates
Interfaces Update, MirrorAuthenticatedDictionary and SourceAuthenticatedDictionary, relate to updating an authenticated dictionary.
The SourceAuthenticatedDictionary interface describes the updates to the authenticated dictionary maintained at the source. It allows the CA to add or remove items from the dictionary. It has two methods: insert and remove. Both methods have a single parameter, the element, and return an Update object. The Update object is used to transmit changes in the dictionary to the directory.
The Update interface contains an execute method that carries out the action of the update on a directory, which could be a single inserthemove operation or a sequence of them. The MirrorAuthenticatedDictionary is the view given to an object of type Update of the authenticated dictionary maintained at the directory. Its only method is used to initialize the directory.
It is assumed that a transport mechanism exists form distributing Update objects and their associated Basis objects to the directory. A schematic interaction diagram for updates is shown in Figure 4 . Note that methods signBasis() and distribute() are not part of the interfaces discussed above.
Because specific implementations of authenticated dic- tionary systems may restrict the types of data that may be stored in the dictionaries, the contains method of AuthenticatedDictionary, as well as the insert and remove methods of SourceAuthenticatedDictionary and the initialize method of MirrorAuthenticatedDictionary may throw exceptions if the user attempts to insert incompatible data.
Also, if a directory is not fed instances of Update in the order in which they were generated at the source, exceptions may arise, depending upon specific implementations.
We show the source code for the above interfaces at the end of this paper, in Figures 10 through 15. 
Implementation
To validate our software architecture for authenticated dictionaries, we have done a prototype implementation of an authenticated dictionary based on skip lists.
Skip Lists
In this section, we review the skip list data structure [30] , which is an efficient means for storing a set S of elements from an ordered universe. It supports the following opera- To define the sample from one level to the next, we choose each element of Sa-l at random with probability 1 / 2 to be in the list S,. The sentinel elements -00 and $00 are always included in the next level up, and the top level, t , is maintained to be O(1og n). The top level is guaranteed to contain only the sentinels. We therefore distinguish the node of the top list St storing -CO as the start node s.
a plateau element of Sa-1. An element that is in both Sa-1 and S, is said to be a tower element in Sa-1. Thus, between any two tower elements, there are some plateau elements. In deterministic skip lists, the number of plateau elements between two towers is at least one and at most three. The expected number of plateau elements between two tower elements is one. (See Figure 5. 
)
For each node w of list S,, we denote with elem(v) the element stored at w. Also, we denote with down(v) the node in S,-1 below w, which stores the same element as w, unless i = 0, in which case down(v) = null. Similarly, we denote with right(w) the node in S, immediately to the right of w, unless ' U is the sentinel storing f00, in which case right(w) = null.
To perform a search for element z in a skip list, we begin at the start node s. Let w denote the current node in our search (initially, w = s). The search proceeds using two actions, forward hop and drop down, which are repeated one after the other until we terminate the search.
An element that exists in S,-l but not in S, is said to be r element less than or equal to 2. That is, while elem(right(w)) < z, we update w = right(w) 
Commutative Hashing
For this paper, we view a cryptographic hash function as a function that takes two integer arguments, x and y, and maps them to an integer h(z,y) that is represented using a fixed number IC of bits (typically fewer than the number of bits of x and y). Intuitively, h(z,y) is a digest for the pair (z,y). We can also use the hash function h to digest a triple, (x, y, z), as h(z, h(y, 2)). Likewise, we can use h to digest larger sequences. Namely, to digest a sequence ( 5 1 , z2,. . . , z,) we can compute
To simplify the verification process that a user has to do in an authenticated dictionary scheme, Goodrich Given a cryptographic hash function h that is collision resistant in the usual sense, we construct a candidate commutative cryptographic hash function, h', as follows [ 181: h ( Q , h ( z z , . ..h(z,-Z,h(z,-l,zm) ).'.)).
h'k, Y) = h(min{x, Yl, max{z, Yl).
It can be shown that h' is commutatively collision resistant [18].
Authenticated Dictionary Based on a Skip List
The authenticated dictionary approach introduced in [I 81 consists of a skip list where each node 'U stores a label computed accumulating the elements of the set with a commutatively cryptographic hash function h. We illustrate the flow of the computation of the hash values labeling the nodes of a skip list in Figure 7 . Note that the computation flow defines a directed acyclic graph, not a tree.
After performing the update in the skip list, the hash values must be updated to reflect the change that has occurred. The additional computational expense needed to update all these values is expected with high probability to be O(1ogn).
The verification of the answer to a query is simple, thanks to the use of a commutative hash function. Recall that the goal is to produce a verification that some element x is or is not contained in the skip list. In the case when the answer is "yes," we verify the presence of the element itself. Otherwise, we verify the presence of two elements z' and x" stored at consecutive nodes on the bottom level SO such that x' < x < x". In either case, the answer authentication information is a single sequence of values, together with the signed, timestamped, label f ( s ) of the start node s. The computation of the node sequence P ( z ) can be done by pushing onto a stack the nodes visited while searching for element x. When the search ends, the stack contains the nodes of P ( x ) ordered from top to bottom. Using this stack, we easily construct the sequence Q ( x ) of node labels.
The user verifies the answer for element z by simply hashing the values of the returned sequence Q ( x ) in the given order, and comparing the result with the signed value f(s), where s is the start node of the skip list. If the two values agree, then the user is assured of the validity of the answer at the time given by the timestamp.
Implementation Details
The six interfaces described in Section 3 have been implemented as Java classes. Additional auxiliary classes have been used. Some implementation details are overviewed below. The class implementing the AuthenticatedDictionary interface uses finite sentinel values. Also, it limits to a given value the height of any tower.
Performance
We have conducted a preliminary experiment on the performance of our data structure for authenticated dictionaries on randomly generated sets of 128-bit integers ranging in size from 100,000 to 700,000. For each operation, the average was computed over 30,000 trials.
The experiment was conducted on a 440MHz Sun Ultra 10 with 256M of memory running Solaris. The Java Virtual Machine was launched with a 200M maximum heap size. Cryptographic hashing was performed using the standard Java implementation of the MD5 algorithm. The signing of the basis by the CA and the signature verification by the user were omitted from the experiment. The highest level of a tower was limited to 20.
The results of the experiment are summarized in Figure 9 . Note that validations, insertions and deletions take less than lms, while queries take less than O.lms. Thus, we feel the use of skip lists and commutative hashing is a scalable solution for the authenticated dictionary. f(4, f(u6)7 f(w), f(u8), f(u, 41, f(u10) ). The user recomputes f ( v l l ) by accumulating the elements of the sequence with the hash function h, and verifies that the computed value of f(vll) is equal to the value signed by the source. As in Figure 7 , the arrows denote the flow of information, not links in the data structure. -100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 number of elements Figure 9 . Average time per operation (in milliseconds) of our Java implementation of an authenticated dictionary using a skip list.
Conclusion
vices, such as PDAs and smart cards.
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authenticated dictionary and a prototype implementation of an efficient and practical data structure for realizing an authenticated dictionary. preliminary experiments show we are able to retain the basic security properties of previous schemes but make the dynamic maintenance of an accumulated dictionary more practical, particularly for contexts where user computations must be performed on simple de- 
